Break In The Chain - Intelligence Ignored: Military Intelligence In Vietnam And Why The Easter Offensive Should Have Turned Out Differently

Features of Break in the Chain - Intelligence Ignored: Military Intelligence in Vietnam and Why the Easter Offensive Should Have Turned out Differently

A riveting combination of war memoir and unique examination of the role of intelligence during the Easter Offensive 1972 written by an intelligence analyst who was there in 1972.For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country.In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the Offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVAs tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Bob Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.Table of ContentsPrefaceChapter 1 - Growing Up an Army BratChapter 2 - Basic TrainingChapter 3 - USA Intelligence SchoolChapter 4 - On To VietnamChapter 5 - My New HomeChapter 6 - The Laos PreludeChapter 7 - Skyline Ridge/Campaign ZChapter 8 - Disrupting Internal AffairsChapter 9 - ABCs of the Easter Offensive of 1972Chapter 10 -The Enemy PlanChapter 11 - What Enemy?Chapter 12 - Day 1: Thursday, 30 March 1972 ...let slip the dogs of war.Chapter 13 - The South Vietnamese Marines and their U.S. AdvisorsChapter 14 - Cut and Run: What ARVN called MobilityChapter 15 - The 571st Recce SquadronChapter 16 - Too, Too Many TanksChapter 17 - In RetrospectChapter 18 - Prologue to SurrenderChapter 19 - A Massacre near the Rockpile?Chapter 20 - NVA Artillery in the Easter OffensiveChapter 21 - The Bridge at Dong HaChapter 22 - NVA Tanks ResumeChapter 23 - U.S.S. Buchanan (DDG-14)Chapter 24 - BAT-21Chapter 25 - Independent NVA Regiment Actions in I Corps AreaChapter 26 - National IntelligenceChapter 27 - Theater and Area CommandsChapter 28 - Diversions and Deceptions at the OnsetChapter 29 - 571st Military Intelligence DetachmentChapter 30 - Observations, Reflections, and ConclusionsChapter 31 - Astrology (tu vi) UseChapter 32 - Southern I CorpsChapter 33 - Quang Trung 729Chapter 34 - Lessons Still DisregardedEpilogueAppendicesIndex