A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory (Philosophical Studies Series, 114),Used

Product Description What kind of properties are moral qualities, such as rightness, badness, etc? Some ethicists doubt that there are any such properties; they maintain that thinking that something is morally wrong (for example) is comparable to thinking that something is a unicorn or a ghost. These 'moral error theorists' argue that the world simply does not contain the kind of properties or objects necessary to render our moral judgments true. This radical form of moral skepticism was championed by the philosopher John Mackie (19171981). This anthology is a collection of philosophical essays critically examining Mackies view. Review From the reviews:'A World without Values contains some of the best contemporary evaluations to date both of Mackie's error theory and of its wider philosophical significance. It is also the first multiauthored work on this scale devoted exclusively to this topic. As such, it is a significant event.' Hallvard Lillehammer (Cambridge University) in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, July 2010Chapter provides a good explanation of Mackies moral error theory. Overall, this volume will be excellent reading for those interested in the strengths and weaknesses of Mackies moral error theory in particular, or in the metaethical debate between moral realists and antirealists more generally. (Diego E. Machuca, Philosophy in Review, Vol. XXXI (5), 2011) From the Back Cover For centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesnt contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as 'killing innocents is morally wrong' fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on ones practical life?Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (19171981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackies views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of metaethics. A World Without Values presents stateoftheart arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any metaethicists bookshelf for some years to come. About the Author Richard Joyce is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He received his PhD from Princeton University in 1998, after which he was a lecturer at the University of Sheffield. He is the author of 'The Myth of Morality' (Cambridge University Press, 2001) and 'The Evolution of Morality' (MIT Press, 2006).Simon Kirchn is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent. He received his PhD from the University of Sheffield and subsequently taught at the University of Bristol. He is the author of a number of papers in metaethics and the coeditor (with Andrew Fisher) of Arguing About Metaethics (2006). He is currently writing a book on thick concepts. He was elected President of the British Society of Ethical Theory in 2008 and is an Assistant Editor of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.