Defusing Democracy: Central Bank Autonomy and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule,Used

Defusing Democracy: Central Bank Autonomy and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule,Used

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SKU: SONG0472112147
UPC: 9780472112142
Brand: University of Michigan Press
Condition: Used
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Many of today's new democracies are constrained by institutional forms designed by previous authoritarian rulers. In this timely and provocative study, Delia M. Boylan traces the emergence of these vestigial governance structures to strategic behavior by outgoing elites seeking to protect their interests from the vicissitudes of democratic rule.One important outgrowth of this political insulation strategyand the empirical centerpiece of Boylan's analysisis the existence of new, highly independent central banks in countries throughout the developing world. This represents a striking transformation, for not only does central bank autonomy remove a key aspect of economic decision making from democratic control; in practice it has also kept many of the wouldbe expansionist governments that hold power today from overturning the neoliberal policies favored by authoritarian predecessors.To illustrate these points, Defusing Democracy takes a fresh look at two transitional polities in Latin AmericaChile and Mexicowhere variation in the proximity of the democratic 'threat' correspondingly yielded different levels of central bank autonomy.Boylan concludes by extending her analysis to institutional contexts beyond Latin America and to insulation strategies other than central bank autonomy. Defusing Democracy will be of interest to anyonepolitical scientists, economists, and policymakers alikeconcerned about the genesis and consolidation of democracy around the globe.Delia M. Boylan is Assistant Professor, Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.

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