Title
Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action (Bradford Book),Used
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Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of desire are distinguishedroughly, genuine desires and pro attitudesapparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.Does action always arise out of desire? G.F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of desire are distinguishedroughly, genuine desires and pro attitudesapparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken.Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At least since Hume argued that reason is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions, many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G.F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various beliefdesire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual beliefdesire accounts need to be replaced.Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard beliefdesire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish desires proper, like a craving for sushi, from socalled pro attitudes, which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's deliberative model of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all.A Bradford Book
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