Efficient Enforcement of TruthTelling in the Grandfathering Process of an Emissions Trading Scheme (Kollektive Entscheidungen, ,New

Efficient Enforcement of TruthTelling in the Grandfathering Process of an Emissions Trading Scheme (Kollektive Entscheidungen, ,New

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SKU: DADAX3631584024
UPC: 3631584024.0
Brand: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften
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Product Description Emissions trading as an instrument to reduce greenhouse gases has found increasing approval over the last years. One of the challenges in putting this instrument into practice is the selfreported character of all firm data. High verification standards are therefore essential, but also costly. This analysis answers the question of how, in the grandfathering process of an emissions trading scheme, selfreported firm data can be verified in a costefficient way. The method used is a principalagent model similar to those in the taxevasion literature. Policy recommendations include specific combinations of random audits and penalties for fraudulent reporting. From a technical perspective the analysis reveals that the efficient verification of private data strongly depends on whether there are incentives to overstate or to understate the private data and that the standard equityefficiency tradeoff does not prevail in this context. About the Author The Author: Frauke Eckermann studied mathematical economics at the Universities of Bielefeld and Birmingham (UK). She worked in the department of Environmental and Resource Economics at ZEW in Mannheim, before accepting a DFGscholarship for the Graduiertenkolleg Allokationstheorie, Wirtschaftspolitik und kollektive Entscheidungen. Currently she works as research associate at the chair of public finance at Technische Universitt Dortmund.

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