Title
The Political Economy Of Trust: Institutions, Interests, And Interfirm Cooperation In Italy And Germany (Cambridge Studies In C
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Trust And Cooperation Are At The Heart Of The Two Most Important Approaches To Comparative Politics Rational Choice And Political Culture. Yet We Know Little About Trusts Relationship To Political Institutions. This Book Sets Out A Rationalist Theory Of How Institutions And In Particular Informal Institutions Can Affect Trust Without Reducing It To Fully Determinate Expectations. It Then Shows How This Theory Can Be Applied To Comparative Political Economy, And In Particular To Explaining Interfirm Cooperation In Industrial Districts, Geographical Areas Of Intense Small Firm Collaboration. The Book Compares Trust And Cooperation In Two Prominent Districts In The Literature, One In Emilia Romagna, Italy, And The Other In Badenwrttemberg, Germany. It Also Sets Out And Applies A Theory Of How National Informal Institutions May Change As A Result Of Changes In Global Markets, And Shows How Similar Mechanisms May Explain Persistent Distrust Too Among Sicilian Mafiosi.
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- Q: How many pages does the book have? A: The book has two hundred fifty-eight pages. This length provides ample content for exploring the themes of trust and cooperation.
- Q: What is the binding type of this book? A: The book is paperback bound. This makes it lightweight and easy to handle for reading.
- Q: What are the dimensions of the book? A: The book measures five point nine nine inches in length, zero point six seven inches in width, and nine point zero two inches in height. These dimensions make it portable for reading.
- Q: Who is the author of the book? A: The author of the book is Henry Farrell. He presents a rationalist theory of trust and institutions.
- Q: What is the main theme of the book? A: The main theme revolves around trust and cooperation in political institutions. It discusses how these concepts interact within various political cultures.
- Q: Is this book suitable for academic study? A: Yes, this book is suitable for academic study. It is part of the Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics series, making it relevant for political science students.
- Q: How should I store this book for longevity? A: Store the book in a cool, dry place away from direct sunlight. This will help preserve the condition of the paperback binding and pages.
- Q: Can this book be used as a reference for research? A: Yes, this book can be used as a reference for research. It provides insights on inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts.
- Q: Does this book include any case studies? A: Yes, the book includes case studies from Emilia Romagna, Italy, and Baden-Württemberg, Germany. These case studies illustrate the book's theories.
- Q: Is this book appropriate for beginners in political science? A: Yes, this book is appropriate for beginners in political science. Its clear explanations make complex ideas accessible.
- Q: What condition is the used book in? A: The used book is in good condition. It’s a reliable option for readers looking for quality at a lower price.
- Q: Are there any illustrations in the book? A: No, the book does not feature illustrations. It focuses on text to convey its arguments and theories.
- Q: What type of audience would benefit from this book? A: Academics, students, and professionals interested in political economy would benefit from this book. It offers in-depth analysis relevant to these audiences.
- Q: What is the publication date of this book? A: The publication date is not specified in the provided details. However, it is part of a reputable academic series.
- Q: What is the main argument presented in the book? A: The main argument is that informal institutions significantly affect trust without reducing it to determinate expectations. This theory is explored in various contexts.