Treatment of Whistleblowers in Minimizing Cartel Damage: Effective ways to fight cartels,Used

Treatment of Whistleblowers in Minimizing Cartel Damage: Effective ways to fight cartels,Used

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SKU: DADAX3846549800
Brand: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
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Economist Antti Koskela searches for an optimal way to prevent cartel damage in society. He evaluates possible ways to promote whistleblowing i.e. confessions of cartels by enhancing the treatment of the whistleblowers. Another important theme is how to prevent economic motivation to form a cartel in a given industry. Koskela notifies that it is nontrivial to find a solution where neither the managers of a firm or the board of directors have motivation to pursue a cartel. Also, if cartels or other malicious antitrust felonies are discovered, who should receive the punishment and how should the punishment be determined? Furthermore, if a cartel is whistleblown, is the confessor a firm or the people who did it? Enter the fascinating world of antitrust economics and policy through this highquality thesis!

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